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Abstract: This paper presents the evolutionary meaning, rationale and 
context of institutions and the linkages that have been necessary to stimulate 
learning and innovation. Institutions and institutional change are central to 
driving learning and innovation. The processes of innovation do not end at 
the point of its creation. Linkages are important in the spread and diffusion 
of stocks of knowledge, which not only act as building blocks for new stocks 
of knowledge but also are synergized further through creative duplication 
and accumulation into new stocks of knowledge. Where linking with 
multinationals has figured strongly leveraging has had a strong influence on 
upgrading. Also important has been the role of meso-organizations that were 
subject to stringent institutions.
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1.  Introduction 
Despite attempts to define institutions its applicative meaning has remained 
without consensus. The dominant position on institutions has been articulated 
by the new institutional economists who argue that the market is the dominant 
institution in driving economic transactions, and that it should define 
the parameters and space left behind for other institutions (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1973; North, 1971). The Nobel Laureate North (1994) defined 
institutions as the rules of the game, and organizations and their entrepreneurs 
as the players. However, such a definition raises some ambiguity as to whether 
they also include organizations and relationships between economic agents 
and organizations. Since institutions refer to influences that govern human 
action, either individually or collectively (through a firm, organization or a 
particular group), and they are considered by many as the sine qua non of 
economic development, evolutionary economists have preferred to keep its 
meaning to capture whatever that holds and molds the standard behavioral 166      Rajah Rasiah  
patterns in societies. Nelson and Sampat (2001) and Nelson (2008a) suggested 
that ‘institutions’ should be used to denote the structures and forces that mold 
and hold in place prevalent behavioural patterns or social technologies. In 
doing so Nelson and Sampat (2001) distinguish physical technologies from 
social technologies by defining the formula (recipe) aspect of the activity as 
physical technology and the way it is structured, coordinated and delivered as 
social technology. Technological progress is core to evolutionary economists 
as it is the propellant of economic progress and structural change (see Nelson, 
2008a, 2008b).
Evolutionary economists argue that the influence of any one or set of 
institutions, or the composition or blend of them within a group in socio-
economic action explains how economic transactions and change occur 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nelson, 2008a, 2008b). It is this evolutionary 
explication, which helps explain the origin and evolution of several industries 
and technologies over time and in different localities that we assume in the 
papers in these two special issues.
The rest of this introductory article is organized as follows. Section two 
explains the relationship between institutions and institutional change and 
innovation. Section three explains the significance of linkages in driving 
learning and innovation. Section four finishes with an overview of the 
evolutionary context of how the articles were selected for issues 3.2 and 3.3 
of the International Journal of Institutions and Economies.
2.  Institutions and Innovations
The importance of institutions and institutional change in the innovation 
process was articulated lucidly by Nelson and Winter (1982) and Nelson 
(2008a). The systemic nature of knowledge flows was demonstrated by 
Marshall (1890), Nelson and Winter (1982: 63), but the importance of 
specialized meso-organizations in attracting the resources to produce 
knowledge (a public good) was emphasized by Nelson (2008a, 2008b). The 
flows of knowledge from R&D labs, universities and firms to other economic 
agents are critical in the spread and snowballing of economic synergies. 
Scitovsky (1954) and Rosenstein-Rodan (1984) distinguished technical 
from pecuniary external economies. Rasiah (1995) and Nelson (2008b) went 
further to discuss the imperfect, yet coordinated and uncoordinated nature 
of knowledge flows. Institutions play a critical role in the production and 
appropriation of economic synergies from the processes that generate learning 
and innovation. The specificity of industries, initial structural conditions and 
the timing of catch up have also attracted different institutional roles (Rasiah, 
1988, 1996, 2002; Hobday, 1995; Malerba, 1992; Malerba et al., 2001; 
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the movement of human capital, to drive systemic synergies. Mature firms in 
open integrated clusters gain new ideas to support continuous organizational 
change as old employees are replaced to make way for fresh ones, while new 
firms benefit from the released entrepreneurial and technical human capital to 
start new firms (Best, 2001; Rasiah, 1994). Rasiah (1994, 2002) and Saxenian 
(1994) documented the development and movement of human capital, which 
supported new firm creation in Penang and the Silicon Valley respectively. 
However, contrary to Marshall (1890) knowledge appropriation is not 
costless, as argued by Lall (1992). The historical sequence to the develop-
ment of technological capabilities through industrial policy started in 
Britain when Henry the VII imposed taxes on exports of wool in 1485 (see 
Reinert, 2007). A series of follow up industrial policies helped the United 
States, Germany, Sweden, Japan, Korea and Taiwan achieve technological 
superiority in increasing returns to industries. Coase (1937, 1992) and North 
(1994) discussed the significance of institutions in production allocation 
and capitalist development, but come short of identifying markets as the 
superior institution in the process. Freeman (1989) had demonstrated using 
the experience of Japan that international flows of stocks of knowledge 
from developed to developing economies take a sequential movement from 
imports to adaptation, assimilation and innovation – all of which are costly 
stages that countries typically go through in moving up the technology ladder. 
While the Marshallian systemic doctrine of knowledge flows remains critical 
in the generation and diffusion of technological spillovers, institutions other 
than markets – regulations by governments, trust relationships supported 
by particular socio-cultural and economic groups and in-house command in 
intermediary organizations (e.g. R&D labs) – have been no less important in 
technological catch up. 
Performance instruments have also acted as strong institutions to support 
technological catch up in some countries. The strong government in South 
Korea ensured that performance standards drove technological catch up 
by Samsung in electronics, Hyundai in shipbuilding and automobiles, and 
the Pohang Steel Company (POSCO) in steel (see Amsden, 1989; Kim, 
1997). The government in South Korea also insulated through expensive 
loans from abroad to shield the successful chaebols from the destabilization 
caused by a rise in oil prices by four times in 1973-1975. The Industrial 
Technical Research Institute created by the Taiwan government in 1973 
was instrumental in driving technological catch up inter alia in information 
hardware, machinery and plastics (see Amsden, 1985; Fransman, 1985). 
The government financed the acquisition of Radio Company of America 
(RCA) in 1979 (Rasiah and Lin, 2005) and the founding of the joint-venture 
company of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) with 
Philips in 1987, which by the end of 2000 had become the world’s leading 168      Rajah Rasiah  
contract manufacturer of fabricated wafers. Using its contract manufacturing 
framework in 2007, TSMC also announced plans to fabricate microprocessors 
by August 2008 (Rasiah et al., 2011).
Governments can create or strengthen the institutions to promote 
agglomeration effects. Governments can also screen particular clusters and 
identify bottlenecks, gaps and weaknesses to ease, fill and ameliorate these 
problems. Such problems can take the form of critical basic infrastructure, 
high tech infrastructure, or supplier firms. Given the problems of information 
asymmetries between government and firms, intermediary organizations such 
as chambers of commerce, training institutions and R&D labs often help 
resolve collective action problems. Interdependent relationships that are driven 
by the discipline of the market, participation of government when public 
goods are involved and complementation through trust-loyalty to extract 
social commitment from the humans directing all of them is vital for the 
development of competitive clusters. Stakeholder coordination (e.g. through 
industry, government, consumer and labour coordination councils) often help 
root and expand social capital.
A lack of firm-level drive, human capital and high tech institutions 
necessary to stimulate innovation and competitiveness have often undermined 
the capacity of clusters to enjoy sustainable differentiation and division 
of labour, which are also the prime reasons for the stagnation that has 
characterized industrial estates in many developing economies. Attempts to 
initiate catch up strategies should start with the mapping of firms, institutions, 
their policy frameworks and integration with markets (global and local), 
and to identify the existing and potential drivers of industrial dynamism in 
particular regions or locations.
3.  Linking, Leveraging and Learning
One of the key pillars of the diffusion and spread of knowledge is the 
argument on path dependence (Freeman, 1988). Linkage is the first step in 
the sequence of learning and innovation. Rather than reinventing the wheel 
most major innovations have benefited from past stocks of knowledge that 
form the starting and driving force of innovations. This is a major advantage 
latecomers enjoy (Gershenkron, 1962).
Both formal and informal channels are critical in linking and learning. 
Formal channels include imports of machinery and equipment, education and 
training of personnel, books and manuals, in-firm internships, licensing and 
acquisition of particular scientific knowledge bases and technologies. Informal 
channels include interactions between people, viewing of demonstrations 
on video and via products through using or viewing. Some interactions are 
stimulated through formal arrangements while others are achieved through Role of Institutions and Linkages in Learning and Innovation      169
informal links between producers and users. The significance of user-producer 
interactions was best articulated by Lundvall (1992).
Several critical channels of linking across borders to knowledge bases 
can be discerned. Trade, investment, human flows and media links are 
some of the channels by which cross border knowledge flows have been 
identified. However, while linking has offered the potential for latecomers 
to connect and subsequently upgrade in particular technologies or co-
evolve different technologies, not all have actually reached the technology 
frontier. Multinationals became a major initiator of knowledge flows in 
both the foreign direct investment (FDI) dependent countries of Malaysia 
and Singapore, and those less dependent on FDI such as Korea and Taiwan. 
Human capital movements within multinationals, relocation of particular 
segments of the value chain at host-sites and the interactions between them 
in different meso-organizations supporting technological change, help explain 
why technological spillover occurs when these relationships are anchored and 
coordinated dynamically and not in locations when much of agglomeration is 
confined to just co-location.
The East Asian rapid industrialization experiences of Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore demonstrate the critical role of leveraging by 
governments to quicken and deepen the flow of knowledge from generating 
firms of frontier countries to recipient firms of latecomer countries. The early 
logic of a standard framework evolved by government to use leveraging as 
a strategy to systematically stimulate technology transfer was articulated 
by Johnson (1982). Johnson argued that ikusei (incubation) was the route 
to spawning local technological catch up through linking with foreign 
multinationals to acquire strategic technology. The use of ex ante vetting, 
monitoring and ex post appraisal to evolve leveraging capabilities in Japan’s 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was well articulated 
by Johnson (1982). These government regulatory instruments acted as key 
institutions that drove learning and innovation in Japanese firms. Amsden 
(1989) and Fransman (1985) presented similar interventions as instruments 
that drove technological catch up in Korea and Taiwan respectively.
4.  Evolutionary Experiences
The central role of institutions and institutional change in driving innovations 
is recognized by evolutionary economists (see Nelson, 2008a, 2008b). 
Hence, issues 3.2 and 3.3 of the International Journal of Institutions and 
Economies are devoted to bringing together evolutionary accounts of 
innovation and learning experiences (including on technological catch up 
and its failure) focusing on their manifestation in institutions, particularly 
in the functioning of meso-organizations to drive linking and learning. The 170      Rajah Rasiah  
successful progression of learning and innovation is argued in the two issues 
as having strong support from positive institutional change while the lack of 
such success, as resulting from a reversal of institutional change or failure 
of institutions. 
Typical of evolutionary approaches, each paper uses methodologies that 
are best suited to the experiences examined, the data available and the issue 
being studied. Papers in these issues show higher adherence to evolutionary 
approaches when the data collected for analysis is ex post of the inductive 
framing of questions. Where papers use data and instruments usually 
associated with neoclassical analysis, they at least attempt to use evolutionary 
concepts to examine technical change and technology spillover.
Note
*    Papers appearing in volume 3, issues 2 and 3 of the International Journal 
of Institutions and Economies were contributed by participants of the 8th 
International Globelics conference that was organized by University of Malaya 
and held on 1-3 November 2010 in Malaysia. Globelics is the acronym for Global 
Network for Economics of Learning, Innovation and Competence Building 
Systems. Comments from Richard Nelson are gratefully acknowledged but the 
errors that remain are mine.
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